PODCAST | ep12 | with Ahmet Akbiyik, Andrew O’Donohue, and SZ
The presidential election in Turkey this spring is shaping up to be the most consequential in decades. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has led the country for twenty years, is facing the staunchest opposition in his career in the form of an unprecedented coalition of six parties, called the “Table of Six.” Their presidential candidate, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has been widely described as low-key, bland, and uncharismatic. But could he be the perfect person to unseat Erdogan? To get us up to speed on this exciting election, we speak with three Graduate Student Associates whose research takes us into the governance, politics, and culture of Turkey—past and present.
Listen to episode #12 (31:15) by clicking the play button below:
SZ sets the stage by invoking the typical raucous mood of Turkish elections through political songs that celebrate various social identities. Although Erdogan silenced the usual soundscape of elections this year by banning public music out of respect for earthquake victims, music nonetheless has emerged.
How does a leader go from being called a “democratizer” to a “strongman”? Andrew O’Donohue explains how Erdogan consolidated the power of the presidency and weakened government institutions during his twenty-year leadership. He notes there are some signs of weakening support for Erdogan, including recent defections from his party and public protests last year against the conviction of the mayor of Istanbul—and would-be presidential contender— for insulting public officials.
Voter polarization makes it difficult to predict the outcome of the elections, explains Ahmet Akbiyik, and his own research has shown the media landscape is equally polarized. He points out the pitfalls of government-friendly businesses owning powerful entities like television stations, newspapers, and even weapons manufacturing.
The scholars emphasize that Turkey holds a unique geopolitical position in central Asia, as it remains a top trading partner with Russia, but also supplies weapons to Ukraine. It’s also a member of NATO and has been seeking membership in the European Union, so any change of government will have an impact on all these factors.
If Erdogan loses, will he accept the outcome of the elections and let go of power? If he wins, will the elections be seen as fair? Will the one million citizens displaced by the earthquake be able to vote? The scholars debate how the public may respond to the election outcome, and whether or not a new regime can strengthen Turkey’s democracy.
Host:
Erin Goodman, Director, Weatherhead Scholars Program.
Guests:
Ahmet Akbiyik, Graduate Student Associate. PhD Candidate, Program in Political Economy and Government, Harvard Kennedy School.
Andrew O’Donohue, Graduate Student Associate. PhD Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University.
SZ, Graduate Student Associate. PhD Candidate, Department of Music, Harvard University.
Producer/Director:
Michelle Nicholasen, Editor and Content Producer, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Related Links:
- Ahmet Akbiyik personal website
- Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, edited by Thomas Carothers and Andrew O'Donohue (Brookings Institution Press, 2019)
- “Turkey’s Changing Media Landscape” by Andrew O’Donohue et al. (Center for American Progress)
- “A Turkish court sentenced Erdogan’s rival to prison. That could backfire.” by Andrew O’Donohue et al. (Monkey Cage, The Washington Post)
- “Eirini Tornesaki: Exploring Intercultural Dialogue through Greek Music” by SZ (American Music Research Center)
The songs featured in this podcast episode include "Hadi Bakalım, Kolay Gelsin," “Bayraktar - Ukrainian War Song,” and “Müslüm Gürses.”
Transcript
[MUSIC PLAYING] (SINGING) [NON-ENGLISH SPEECH]
ERIN GOODMAN: Welcome to the Epicenter podcast from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. I'm your host, Erin Goodman, director of the Weatherhead Scholars Program. Presidential elections will take place on May 14 in Turkey on the eve of the Republic Centennial. What's unique about this cycle is that longtime President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is facing perhaps the tightest race since he first came to power. Erdogan has ruled turkey for 20 years, first as prime minister, then president and, during his terms, has consolidated the power of the presidency.
But now, a six-party coalition is challenging him, and a low key opponent is gaining in popularity, its veteran politician Kemal Kilicdaroglu, called the Turkish Gandhi by some. Elections happen every five years in Turkey, and there are some five million new voters. If Erdogan and his AK party lose the election, it could be a chance for a new generation to wrest back the elements of their democracy that have eroded under the past two decades.
Today, we're turning to three Weatherhead graduate associates, whose scholarship reaches deeply into Turkish politics, government, and culture, to help us understand what's at stake in this election. Ahmet Akbiyik is a PhD candidate in political economy and government at the Harvard Kennedy School. His research focuses on migration, social cohesion, and the role of the media in shaping public opinion.
Andrew O'Donohue is a PhD candidate in political science here at Harvard and a National Science Foundation graduate research fellow. He's co-editor of the book Democracies Divided-- the Global Challenge of Political Polarization and previously worked in Turkey as a research fellow at the Istanbul Policy Center. And today, he joins us from Istanbul.
SZ is a third year PhD candidate and ethnomusicology, studying the interaction of popular music and political movements in Turkey. Outside of the music department, she's also pursuing a secondary field in anthropology.
[MUSIC PLAYING]
(SINGING) [NON-ENGLISH SPEECH]
SZ, let's start with you. To get a sense of the atmosphere of political campaigning in Turkey, let's start with music. What are we listening to? And what's the musical tradition in Turkish politics?
SZ: Yes, today, I wanted to open with this song, which was one of the most popular election songs in Turkey in the early '90s. It's an adaptation of Pop Diva Sezen Aksu's hugely popular "Hadi bakalım, kolay gelsin" which roughly translates to "come on then" or "let's see."
And it's words were rewritten in support of the then prime ministerial candidate Mesut Yılmaz. Election music in Turkey has several decade long history. And generally, election years are extremely festive and carnivalesque. The use of music in elections started around the 1970s. Songs were composed for, adapted to, and featured in rallies. And political parties used to distribute cassette tapes with election mix tapes, some of which you can still find on YouTube.
Additionally, vans with loudspeakers attached to them will drive around public squares loudly playing their party's election song. This year, however, the election soundscape is very different due to the earthquakes in Southeast Turkey. President Erdogan declared that all music prepared for the election is banned and that it would be a quote "musicless campaign."
Most interlocutors with whom I have spoken have not expressed regret at the election being without music, often viewing the election soundscape as one of extreme sensory overload, regardless of which party they support. Nonetheless, there is still music being performed, recorded, and shared in the digital sphere, which may suggest different visions for Turkey's future in this pivotal year.
ERIN GOODMAN: So let's Zoom out and talk about the state of Turkey's democracy today. And can we count on the fact that the election will be free and fair or that Erdogan would give up power if he lost?
ANDREW O'DONOHUE: Thanks, Erin, for that question. I think that this is one of the most interesting questions facing Turkey today. And today, Turkey is what political scientists would likely call a competitive authoritarian regime, to use a term coined by my advisor Steve Levitsky and his co-author Lucan Way.
And what that means is that this May the elections in Turkey are going to be real but unfair. The elections are real in the sense that the votes will be counted, and Erdogan could lose. Erdogan has to sweat on election day and the outcome isn't predetermined. But the playing fields in the months and years leading up to this election between Erdogan and his opponents has been anything but fair.
And thinking about Ahmet's research and the media environment in Turkey more broadly, the state-funded broadcaster TRT is akin almost to free advertising for the government. The government has brokered deals with large media outlets, which have been sold to government-friendly businesses. And opposition outlets have been fined or face legal sanctions for reporting on sensitive issues, like corruption or the government's handling of responses to natural disasters.
So given that environment, I think the most interesting question is whether Erdogan would concede defeat and give up power freely. And this is an area where there's a huge disagreement between analysts in the United States and those that I'm talking to here in Turkey. So people in the US tend to think Erdogan doesn't have the power to let power go. Of course, he would steal the election if push came to shove. But people in Turkey can tend to think the culture of respecting elections here is too strong for Erdogan to challenge the results. And there are reasons for optimism and pessimism on both of these sides.
So one worrying sign is that the high election council, or YSK, is very likely to take the government side in disputes over the integrity of these elections. So most notably, in March 2019 when the opposition won an election for the mayor of Istanbul, the government alleged election irregularities. And this council required that election be rerun.
But a hopeful sign, I think, is that even Erdogan's party has suffered some pretty high profile defections in recent years. So Fahrettin Koca, the former health minister, who led a very competent response to the COVID pandemic, Mehmet Simsek, a former finance minister, these people have declined to run on the AKP's ticket. So there are signs that officials within the AKP, and the state bureaucracy more broadly, are just sticking with Erdogan but are thinking already about a post Erdogan future.
ERIN GOODMAN: Thank you, Andrew. Would anyone else like to comment on that?
AHMET Yeah, thank you so much for this question. And so I can comment on Andrew's point. So I mostly agree. It's a challenging situation right now in Turkey, and it's not only about being free or fair. It's also about the polarization. So the country is really polarized right now, so that's why it's really hard to understand which way the elections are going right now. If we check the last most recent polls, there is no significant difference between the incumbent party leader, President Erdogan, and opposition party leader Kilicdaroglu. And this shows how polarized the country right now.
And I also agree with Andrew on the point that Istanbul elections in 2019 was a good example of we don't need to worry much about whether Erdogan will give up the power or not. According to election results, if there's a necessity for the change, it will happen. However, we are not sure about the election results yet for sure, and the polls are not showing us a clear direction for now. So it's unclear on the polls.
ERIN GOODMAN: Thank you. So let's dig in to these two candidates. Andrew, could I ask you to review Erdogan's record and tell us a bit about how he transformed Turkey's democracy?
ANDREW O'DONOHUE: So I think the key context for understanding how Erdogan has transformed turkey is that paradoxically Erdogan was celebrated for democratizing Turkey during his first decade in office. And that might be surprising if you are reading headlines today that describe Erdogan as a strongman, as an autocrat, as a sultan, or if you listen to anything that Ahmed, and I just said.
But when Erdogan's justice and development party, the AKP first came to power in 2002, he claimed to represent the people against a political establishment that was genuinely anti-democratic. So Erdogan's main opponents lay in the military, the judiciary, and an indirectly elected presidency. And those three institutions were bastions of Turkey's old secularist elite.
So for example, when Erdogan passed a constitutional amendment that would allow Muslim women to wear the headscarf at public universities, the Constitutional Court stood in the way and struck it down. When Erdogan's party tried to elect its own candidate as president, the military waded into politics and issued a public warning that it would stand up to any threat against secularism.
And so when Erdogan passed changes that overhauled the military and the judiciary, these changes looked democratic. But paradoxically, the process of transforming these institutions and replacing the people inside them gave Erdogan tremendous control over state power. So for example, in 2010, when Turkey passed a constitutional referendum that democratized the judiciary, some of these reforms were genuinely democratic, for example, getting rid of seats that protected the space for military judges on the Constitutional Court. But others also gave the government greater control over how judges and public officials will be appointed.
So I think three events are really key here in understanding how Erdogan accumulated this tremendous power in his hands. The first in 2013 was the government's crackdown on protests in Gezi Park in which demonstrations to protect a green space in Istanbul snowballed into nationwide protests against the government. The second in 2016 was the failed coup attempt against Erdogan. Turks rightly celebrated the failure of that coup attempt as a victory for democracy. And I vividly remember being here in Istanbul and attending some of those democracy watches and rallies. But in the aftermath of that coup attempt the government declared a state of emergency that lasted for two years.
And a third key event that happened during that state of emergency was a constitutional referendum that eliminated the Office of Prime Minister in Turkey and concentrated power in the hands of Turkey's President and created what's known as a hyperpresidential system. So those three events in combination mean that, going into election day, Erdogan has significant sway over state resources.
ERIN GOODMAN: So this perhaps explains why a six party coalition has come together to challenge Erdogan. Could you explain this and also introduce us to the presidential opponent?
ANDREW O'DONOHUE: : Yes, the historic opposition candidate for president is Kemal Kilicdaroglu, and he's historic, precisely as you said, because he's been chosen to represent a remarkably diverse coalition of six political parties known as the table of six. As Ahmed said, Turkey's society is deeply polarized, not only between government and opposition, but also across numerous other cleavages that are religious, nationalist, ethnic. And what's historic about the table of six is that it includes Islamist parties, secular parties, nationalist parties, parties founded by defectors from the AKP.
But what's interesting about Kilicdaroglu is that he is also a very weak candidate. He's exactly the candidate, it seems, that Erdogan wanted to run against. So to start, he's 74 years old, so even older than Erdogan himself. He's a religious minority from the Alevi community in a country that's mainly Sunni Muslim. And he's a technocrat and a former civil servant. My favorite fact about Kilicdaroglu is that he won bureaucrat of the year in 1994. So in head-to-head polling versus Erdogan, Kilicdaroglu has actually performed worse than two other candidates that the opposition could have chosen, the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara.
So you might be wondering, why did the opposition go with seemingly a quite weak candidate? And one reason is a court case from this December that cast a legal shadow over an alternative candidate, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. And crucially, Imamoglu was convicted by a lower court in Turkey of insulting public officials, and he could be barred from running for president if that conviction is upheld on appeal. So that was something that knocked out a potential alternative candidate.
But I think what's most interesting and paradoxical is that Kilicdaroglu's humility, his reputation as a consensus builder rather than as an attention-getter makes him actually quite a strong candidate. He's invested in building relationships across party lines. He's been able to hold together this coalition of six parties. And when you walk around the streets of Istanbul, you see in the posters for his ads that he's using this coalition as a source of strength. You don't just see Kilicdaroglu's face on the ads. You see the two mayors standing behind him. So he comes across as someone who's humble, who's acceptable to diverse groups of voters in Turkey's polarized society.
ERIN GOODMAN: Thanks, Andrew. Would anyone else like to comment about the opposition candidate?
AHMET: Yeah, I can jump in at this point. So one of the biggest concerns about opposition right now, they have this so-called common enemy. And over there, they're just coming together for being against Erdogan. And the concern is what happens if they get the power from Erdogan? Can they stay together? So this is what people are discussing on the streets of Istanbul, Ankara, everywhere in Turkey.
So right now, the opposition tries to convince people we will stay together after getting the power. But still, it's up on the air. It's a question to answer for the opposition leaders.
ERIN GOODMAN: So this is what people are saying on the street. Could you tell us about what the latest polls are saying and also whether the recent earthquake has any impact on the outcome?
AHMET: Absolutely. As I mentioned, the most recent polls, there is no significant difference between the candidates. So it's like 50/50 right now. It's quite interesting. It's quite close how polarized is Turkey. But it's quite challenging to interpret those results because polling data can be influenced by factors like social desirability bias where people answer questions in a way that they think is socially acceptable and sample selection bias may be there as well.
And this is especially tricky in a polarized environment where people may be afraid to express their true opinions. And this is not only a case for the government supporters or the opposition supporters. It may play in both for these groups.
And another interesting thing is, right now, when we look at the polls, they only capture the opinions of those who are eligible to vote in Turkey. However, Turkish citizens living abroad could have different opinions, and we are talking about around 4 million people. And these are not accounted for these current polls. And in the 2018 Turkish presidential elections, where President Erdogan won, he got a lot of votes, like the 60% from Turkish citizens living abroad. And right now, we are talking about 4 million extra votes. So it may change the results accordingly.
And you also asked about the earthquake, unfortunately, there was a devastating earthquake in Turkey in February 2023, which caused a lot of damage. While people were initially upset and angry with the government response, recent polls show that President Erdogan's popularity is recovering.
However still, it's difficult to know how many people have moved away from the affected region, and more importantly, if they were able to transfer their working location to their new area. So the number of the votes may change accordingly. There are still over 1 million earthquake survivors who cannot go back to their homes, and it just adds up to the complexity of the incoming elections in Turkey.
ERIN GOODMAN: Let's go back to music and campaigning, SZ, you mentioned that there is a ban on music. And yet, Erdogan and his party have created music that's been on YouTube as an election song. Could you tell us about that?
SZ: Yes, so despite the ban just two weeks ago, the official Turkish radio and television's news channel published an AKP election song on YouTube. It's titled Söyle which can be translated speak, tell, or maybe even sing. And the song has also been performed live, and I'm not entirely sure how they framed this performance in terms of the music list campaign. The song is really interesting both from a musical and textual perspective.
And I'd like to share a clip from the center portion of the song. It's roughly divided into two sections. There's a very meditative lyrical opening with a single female voice accompanied by some light piano and strings. And then it really gears up in the middle part, which is the portion I'd like to share.
[AUDIO PLAYBACK]
[MUSIC PLAYING]
(SINGING IN TURKISH)
[END PLAYBACK]
SZ: So the interesting thing about this song, it-- has an extremely epic and heroic feel. And regardless of whether you support Erdogan's party or whether a Turkish voter may support Erdogan's party, it's a really cool song. The video itself is very interesting because it's replete with imagery of Ottoman Warriors, which suggests that its call to listeners to draw upon inspiration from the past in order to press towards a bright future is referring to the Ottoman past rather than the early Republican past, thus interpreting 2023 as a foundational moment for Turkey away from the vision of its founder.
There are also a number of references to Turkish poetry and literature within the text. There are frequent references to Anatolia, for example, in the line of "Anadolu yükselsin", or let Anatolia rise again, which I see as treating Anatolia as a kind of populist heartland.
There are also references to the "Kuvayı-Milliye Destanı," which is the Epic of the National Militia by leftist poet Nazim Hikmet, which interestingly, decenters traditional war heroes in the struggle and highlights the role of nameless heroes. I interpret this as encouraging common voters to rise up to be national heroes, especially in light of the failed 2016 coup attempt, where Erdogan's supporters played a major role in suppressing the faction of the military responsible for the coup. This reference might invoke a similar sentiment.
So just because the election atmosphere isn't being primed by election trucks roaming the streets and playing celebratory music, this doesn't mean that music isn't being treated and evaluated as a symbol of different visions for Turkey's future at this pivotal moment.
ERIN GOODMAN: That's so interesting, and the song itself hearkens back to Turkey's historically important position as a geopolitical player, which it has been for centuries. And it continues today to be in a strategic position between Europe and Central Asia and now a NATO member. So it's trying to project a neutral role vis a vis Russia, which is its major trading partner. What would be the implications of an Erdogan victory or defeat in the region and perhaps on the war in Ukraine? Andrew, would you like to comment on that?
ANDREW O'DONOHUE: Yes, I think this reflects SZ's point about how Erdogan's vision for the country, his vision for 2023 has been deeply implicated with Turkey's broader geopolitical and global role, which Erdogan has sought to assert and strongly appeal to in nationalist terms in his campaign. For example, here in Istanbul, he's parked Turkey's first domestically built aircraft carrier the Anadolu or Anatolia, right in the harbor. But I think that, what I would say in a foreign policy perspective, is that certain challenges with Turkey's foreign policy are political or related to Erdogan and other challenges are structural and will exist regardless of who is in power.
So to start with the political, the opposition has signaled that it will take a much more constructive approach to engagement with NATO and the EU in particular. So most recently, president Erdogan has held up or blocked the accession of Sweden to NATO, even though he's allowed Finland's bid to proceed. That's something that the opposition says it would do, allowing Sweden to become an integral part of NATO. But other things will remain challenges.
Turkey is in a position of asymmetric interdependence with Russia. It's highly dependent on Russian gas and tourism economically, and benefited tremendously from striking a neutral posture vis a vis sanctions on Russia. Those challenges will persist and limit the opposition's foreign policy options vis a vis Russia in particular. So I would say that an opposition victory doesn't necessarily translate into a Turkey that is going to act against its economic interests by fully embracing sanctions that have not been approved by the United Nations.
ERIN GOODMAN: Ahmet would you like to add to that at all?
AHMET: Of course, of course, again, from another side of the story is the Turkish government is helping a lot the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian war on the area, especially about there's a huge discussion about the Turkish drones right now. So it's a huge discussion points for the Turkish politics. These drones are created by Bayraktar Company, which has an affiliation connection with the Turkish government because the son-in-law of Erdogan is basically the leader of this company, Bayraktar Company.
However, they are still providing a number of drones, weaponized drones to Ukraine. And there is even a song about these drones created by Ukrainian soldiers. Maybe we can also hear that one as well. So it's a huge discussion because right now opposition makes in some critics about this drone company for some people, according to some media outlets in Turkey. And for some others, people believe that even opposition parties win, they will not change anything about these drones. And they will accept this company as well.
So this is a company creating drones and aircrafts. And it's affiliated with the Turkish government, to some extent. And that's why there's a huge discussion about whether this company will prevail after the elections or not if the opposition parties win.
ERIN GOODMAN: Let's listen to a clip of this Ukrainian song that became popular after its release in March 2022 after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
[AUDIO PLAYBACK]
[MUSIC PLAYING]
(SINGING IN TURKISH)
[END PLAYBACK]
SZ: And they sing the whole chorus. They sing Bayraktar, Bayraktar referring to this drone. The drone is pictured in the music video. It's actually a really interesting song because it's very celebratory, and the imagery of the video is very much juxtaposed. The imagery of the video and the tone of the sound itself is very much juxtaposed with what the lyrics are saying. So you have a video of these soldiers in full uniform and often surrounded by scenes of war with huge guns.
And they're talking about the drones, and they're singing about the drones. And they even say at the beginning of the video, thank you, President Erdogan. And the tone of the song is very upbeat. It's very jubilant. It's like a party. And yet, you're confronted by this imagery of these soldiers dancing with these huge guns and cursing the Russian army. So it's really interesting to have these two elements juxtaposed.
And I think the juxtaposition actually elicits a really strong emotional response because you see these soldiers very much humanized. They're having fun with their comrades. They're having a moment of peace in the conflict. So I think the song is a really powerful piece of political commentary.
AHMED: Yeah, I would agree. So definitely, these drones are useful for the war. But the biggest positive part is coming from psychological. So they are really supportive in terms of psychology for these Ukrainian soldiers.
ERIN GOODMAN: Wow, that is quite the tribute on many levels. Turning now to media, Ahmet, what have you found in your research about media consumption and what it might suggest for voters in this election?
AHMET: Yeah definitely. I would like to talk more about that. Let me give you some background in Turkey, As we mentioned earlier, there is a lot of political division, which can also be seen in the media. People tend to stick to news sources that align with their political views. On social media about half of the attention goes to opposition-related outlets, and the other half goes to the pro-government outlets, and we can see that through the number of the followers for each media outlet.
The government has a larger reach on mass media, though, such things as TV channels and newspapers. But still we cannot talk about full control of the media as opposition groups still have some access. Both sides tend to focus on their own supporters rather than trying to bridge the gap, unfortunately. One factor that gives the Government an advantage on mass media is that businessmen close to the ruling AK party have both well-known old media outlets In the recent years.This has allowed the government to have a bigger presence in the traditional media. Despite this, as I mentioned, opposition groups still have access to some mass media outlets, so we are seeing a huge competition on that end.
Our research involved asking people to follow a media outlet that presented a different perspective from their own beliefs. We found that when people who support the government followed anti-government media sources, it had limited the effects on their opposition views. However, from the other hand, following pro-government media sources led to more positive views and intentions to vote for the ruling party. This was quite interesting for us.
This could be because pro-government media outlets have been established for many years and are well known while anti government online outlets are relatively new and not as well known in Turkish society. This suggests that the government's efforts to acquire established media outlets are proving successful in shaping public opinion in their favor.
ANDREW O'DONOHUE: To build on Ahmet's point that the media space in Turkey has been a major asset for Erdogan, especially as mainstream outlets have been taken over by businessmen friendly to the government, I think one thing that does give me some amount of hope is that the media space in Turkey is also extremely dynamic. So as Ahmed pointed out, the fact that many TV channels are progoverment is an important asset for Turkish citizens for the government.
In a survey that I conducted with colleagues from the Center for American Progress in 2018, a nationally representative survey of 2,000 Turkish citizens, 72% said TV is their main source of political news. And that's a major asset for the government. But at the same time, there are important sources of change and resistance within the Turkish media space. So even Erdogan's own supporters know they're not getting the full truth from the media.
Among Turkish citizens who previously voted for AKP, about 1 in 3 will tell pollsters that the media isn't able to speak freely. And especially among opposition voters, these perceptions of censorship and distrust of the media are associated with an important shift toward online media sources, new media sources, and especially towards social media.
So you might think that with Erdogan in power for 20 years he has full control over the media space. But as Ahmed is pointing out, that's not fully true. And even some of his own supporters know they're not getting the full truth from TV channels and media stations that they're watching.
AHMET: I think another important and interesting point of the elections in Turkey is that voter turnout is really high compared to other places all around the world. In 2018 elections, voter turnout was 86%. And right now, there's a similar or even higher ratios expected for the coming elections. And voter turnout is an indication of the level of civil engagement in the country. It shows the percentage of eligible voters who are actually participating in an election.
A higher voter turnout suggests that citizens are actively engaged in the democratic process and are invested in the outcome of the election. That's why this election is really important for the Turkish citizens, and the outcome is really important for them. And they are always part of this process of election.
ERIN GOODMAN: Thank you, Ahmet. These are clearly a very consequential elections with several major issues on the table, not only within Turkey, but also including the future of democratic regimes in the region, Turkey's relations with the European Union, and even potentially influencing the outcome of Russia's war against Ukraine.
I'd like to thank our graduate student associates, Ahmet Akbiyik, Andrew O'Donohue, and SZ for getting us up to speed on these very consequential upcoming elections in Turkey and for giving us vital background on the political history and culture of campaigning there.
ANDREW O'DONOHUE: My concluding thought is I am so glad SZ's music trucks that play campaign music are not driving around my neighborhood at 1 am.
[LAUGHTER]
That would not be fun.
SZ: Yeah. Oh, man.
ERIN GOODMAN: We wish you all well on your doctoral journeys. You can read about their work on our website. Just search for Epicenter at Harvard University. Many thanks to our listeners. If you value our conversation, please, take a moment to click the Subscribe button on your favorite listening platform. This is Erin Goodman signing off from the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.