If China attempts reunification with Taiwan, how will the US meet its obligations to defend it? Two visiting fellows and officers of the US Air Force insist that the US must improve its preparedness for a new type of conflict.
by Ken Fann and Charles Bursi
Last summer, Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan made headlines around the world. As the then-Speaker of the House, she was the highest-ranking US official to visit in decades. Her trip to this small democratic island only 100 miles from Communist China set off a firestorm of internal debates on the US’s East Asia strategy. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials trumpeted their frustration with the US’s incoherent diplomacy and launched aggressive military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Ultimately, Pelosi’s visit brought focus to the value of Taiwan in US domestic and foreign policy.
Americans may understand the symbolic importance of Taiwan as a small democracy under threat from a giant autocratic bully. However, articulating the importance of Taiwan in terms of American interests is more challenging. Some foreign policy experts believe that China will attempt to take back Taiwan in the next ten years. Some have referenced 2027 as the CCP’s “target year” for a move to unify Taiwan, and others have referenced dates as early as 2025.
The United States must do everything in its power to delay China from making that fateful move, by projecting not only soft power and diplomacy, but also hard military power. In this essay, we briefly explain why Taiwan is critical to US interests; then we offer best-case strategies for the US military to stay nimble in the Indo-Pacific and to keep Taiwan equipped to defend itself with a so-called “porcupine” strategy, explained below.
Taiwan’s Importance to the US
We believe there are at least three reasons why Taiwan is valuable to the US: democracy, microchips, and trade.
- Democracy. From the ashes of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Taiwan emerged as a model liberal democratic entity for other Indo-Pacific nations, in sharp contrast to China’s legacy of population control, violence, and oppression.
- Microchips. Today, an estimated five trillion dollars a year flows through the South China Sea in global trade. A strategically vital part of that trade is the 80–85 percent of the world’s advanced microchips that Taiwan produces annually. Taiwan’s position in the tech and artificial intelligence industry is critical to American industry. In a military action against Taiwan, America could be cut off from this vital production capability. To be certain, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and countries all over the globe would feel similar impacts—if not worse. Although the 2022 Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) Protection Act is intended to reduce some portion of US reliance on offshore microchip production, increases to US domestic chip production capabilities will take years, perhaps decades. Indeed, disruption to the advanced semiconductor chips produced by the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation would have grave consequences for the US economy and national defense.
- Trade. Taiwan’s geographic position lies in a global trade “choke point,” and PRC control of this key economic terrain could have a wide range of negative impacts. For example, seizure of Taiwan could cause disruption of regional fishing and food distribution. If multinational corporations pull out of mainland China for safety reasons, experts predict global supply chain interruptions would emerge, and the PRC would enforce naval blockades of global shipping and energy routes.
Recognizing US Military Vulnerability
Diplomacy is always the preferred path out of conflict, and it is essential that US diplomats and senior leaders continue to project soft power, and pursue dialogue to avoid the Thucydidian self-fulfilling prophecy that war with the PRC is inevitable. But more critically, our hard power capabilities have eroded from where they were at the end of the Cold War. The US must remedy this problem on the global stage, especially since US-China relations have frayed over the past decade, due to issues with China’s trade practices, its military build-up in the South China Sea, human rights abuses, and the distrust stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.
In the wake of a twenty-year war in the Middle East, the last three years of pandemic response, and now the war in Ukraine, today the United States’s ability to protect, sustain, and lead in the Indo-Pacific region is being challenged. Senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders recently highlighted the urgent and timely need for building up our inventory of military hardware. The intended audience for these statements are US congressional decision makers and DoD personnel. The purpose of these statements is to focus attention on the US’s need to increase defense readiness. Not only will we need to upgrade equipment, US strategy and operational techniques also need to be reimagined. The US Air Force applied resources to Operation DESERT SHIELD in August of 1990, in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and conducted continuous operations in the Mideast until 2021. This thirty-year focus on “low-intensity” air conflict has enabled multiple generations of US military personnel to enjoy unfettered air superiority and 24/7 support from US aircraft and space assets.
The US focus on the Middle East has also enabled the PRC to complete a twenty-year military buildup that systematically degrades many of the US’s essential warfighting capabilities and doctrines. A recent simulation conducted by the Center for Strategic International Studies provided an assessment of US, Taiwan, and Japan’s ability to respond to China’s aggression. The somber takeaway is that the trilateral defense in this wargame was able to overcome PRC aggression against Taiwan in most cases but “lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of personnel.” The message was clear: the time for strengthening deterrence is now. Many assumptions are presented in the wargame, such as the following: Taiwan’s forces must be able to defend their nation without support for weeks; Taiwan must be armed appropriately to accomplish this; Japan’s involvement is required; and the US must be able to strike at the Chinese naval fleet rapidly from outside China’s robust air and sea defenses. As stated, in most scenarios the trilateral defense was able to defeat PRC aggression and their invasion of Taiwan—but the cost was incredibly high and on a level the US hasn’t seen since Vietnam. This confirms that avoidance of this conflict is the best option, and it also raises the question of how to deter China.
A Procedural/Cultural Shift Is Needed
Our answer on how best to deter conflict is twofold: expand bases abroad and switch from the status quo model of “efficient and consistent” operational strategy to one that is more “light and lean.”
First, we need to expand US DoD basing, international access, and overflight permissions throughout the Pacific theater. Former US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper began these efforts in earnest in 2019 and secured additional access to the island nations of Yap and Palau. Current Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin conducted discussions in early 2023 with Philippine leaders on expanded base locations. This is a promising start, but more action is needed.
Second, we need to adopt a “light and lean” operational strategy. Another important effort is the US Air Force’s ongoing development of its Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept. The ACE concept was born out of the need to respond to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) increased long-range missile attack capability and rapidly expanding warfighting, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. This PLA strategy falls under its broader “Anti-Access and Area Denial” (A2AD) strategy that threatens the US-Pacific military basing and infrastructure. When China’s A2AD strategy is combined with the Pacific Ocean’s vast distances, US effectiveness drops in a defense of Taiwan scenario. Far from perfected, ACE represents a “best we can do with what we have” mindset and reflects the broader DoD shift from counterinsurgency methods to strategic competition with peer adversaries (i.e., China and Russia). If the PRC initiated hostilities, the intent of ACE is to continuously move US forces between bases and fighting locations in a manner that makes PLA targeting of US and allied bases less effective.
To further counter the A2AD strategy, the DoD and Air Force are conducting some of the largest operational and cultural shifts since the early 1990s. Due to rapid advances in Chinese and Russian offensive weapons (e.g., jets, missiles, and drones) the US’s ability to efficiently consolidate large supplies of war reserve materials and aircraft close to hostile territory is greatly challenged. The luxury of being able to respond at a time and place of our choosing is also rapidly narrowing. This requires the DoD and Air Force to become more agile and lean. In this context, “agile” refers to the ability to rapidly move people, airplanes, and equipment; and “lean” refers to less equipment at each base with austere or “minimum infrastructure.” As Air Force Chief of Staff General Brown stated, “to generate combat power from a number of locations to create dilemmas for an adversary... I just need a runway, a ramp, weapons trailer, a fuel bladder, and a pallet of [Meals Ready to Eat].”
This cultural shift from “efficient and consistent” to “light and lean” is not without challenges. For example, operating aircraft in a contested environment is a challenge the Air Force hasn't faced since 1991. In this context, “contested” refers to an adversary’s ability to defeat or disrupt US air operations. Most US airmen today are unaccustomed to large-scale loss of human life and unreplaceable equipment (at the hands of an enemy). The US Air Force is similarly unfamiliar with a ”peer” enemy that is able to disrupt the US’s ability to detect objects and distribute decisions to military forces—that is, able to disrupt the US military’s Command and Control (C2) capabilities. US wargames routinely highlight the impact of C2 disruptions or shortfalls, in peacetime and in war. A peacetime illustration of this potential is the recent PRC violations of US sovereign airspace with high-altitude intelligence balloons. These PLA balloon incursions and similar PRC intelligence-gathering operations in air, space, and cyberspace have gone undetected or were too slowly detected to provide US policy makers with sufficient awareness of increasing threats to the US homeland. In the vast Pacific Ocean, the US also has shortfalls in our C2 networks’ ability to detect and monitor objects approaching Pacific territories and the US mainland. If early awareness of threats is desired, investment in high-level surveillance technology is required. Additional shortfalls are the DoD’s equipment readiness, aging aircraft, and munitions shortages.
Military Hardware
The US Air Force’s current inventory of aircraft and weapons is optimized for the Mideast theater and uncontested air operations (i.e., air operations with no real or capable adversary). To deter or respond to PRC aggression against Taiwan, the Air Force must develop aircraft and munitions that have the ability to accomplish a mission while being engaged with kinetic air defenses (e.g., anti-aircraft missiles and artillery, enemy fighter aircraft) and nonkinetic air defense (e.g., laser or electronic attack, GPS jamming, or cyberattacks).
Aircraft and weapons capable of routinely operating in this kind of environment are expensive and not easy to develop quickly. Examples of these systems include: currently fielded F-22 and F-35 fighter aircraft (neither of which were procured in sufficient numbers); new aircraft like the B-21 bomber and Next Generation Air Defense (NGAD) system; new weapons like the Air Intercept Missile 260 and Long Range Anti-Ship Missile; new capabilities like Airborne Battle Management System; and a host of other ongoing developments.
These are the capabilities the Air Force needs but are not on the DoD’s anticipated 2025–2027 readiness timeline. Remember, to be effective, deterrence has three basic components: a real capability, signaling of that capability to adversaries, and the will to use a capability in conflict. With the correct blend of capabilities—conventional and nuclear, manned and unmanned, and with the correct munitions—PRC planners will be forced back to the drawing board.
Within the Pacific Air Forces’ lexicon is the concept of “not today.” Understanding the PRC’s desire to create a single China, our goal is to keep that an aspiration for the distant future. If Beijing starts planning reunification on a shorter time horizon, the threat of military conflict increases.
The Porcupine Strategy
Due to trends in the US and global economies, it seems unlikely that all the above capabilities will be realized in the near term. Therefore, it’s necessary to turn to Taiwan and its current defense strategies and preparation. After decades of assessments and papers, the best option appears to be the “porcupine strategy.” This strategy was first introduced by then-chief of Taiwanese military forces Lee Hsi-Ming in 2017. Given the genial nature of a porcupine, it seems it is an easy meal for a belligerent predator. But when one sees the porcupine’s quills, it’s easy to imagine the difficulty a predator has in attacking—much less winning—a fight with a porcupine. In the military sense, this analogy helps visualize what the mountain-island of Taiwan looks like bristling with low-tech and mobile anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and anti-ship weapons.
To execute its responsibilities outlined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the US has a policy "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character." In this regard, the US has been providing mobile munitions—such as shoulder-held anti-aircraft and tank missile launchers and attack drones—before conflict, with a focus on the “porcupine” model. Like the porcupine, this strategy enables the smaller party to have the potential to inflict enough damage that it deters actions of the larger aggressor. Furthermore, this approach has been validated by lessons learned from Russia’s war on Ukraine, where Ukraine has held off Russia using foreign-supplied mobile weapons. Another lesson learned from Ukraine is that resupply after hostilities commence is militarily and politically complex. To improve these efforts, delays of munitions transfer must be reduced. This would increase Taiwan’s ability to deter near-term CCP-initiated military aggression, and hopefully provide sufficient time for the US Air Force to recapitalize its forces and bases.
China is intent on reunifying Taiwan. PRC actions and PLA military expansion over the past two decades suggests they are preparing for a move in the near term. As a protector ally, the US must do more than diplomacy to achieve deterrence. Continuing to supply the Taiwanese with defensive weapons is an important step toward effective deterrence. But this step is not a panacea. It cannot be in lieu of focused efforts on behalf of the US, and our Pacific Allies must recapitalize our own military capabilities. Admittedly, upgrading US hard power is a high-risk and high-payoff strategy. But skeptics of this should consider the risk of US unpreparedness, and the resulting risk to America’s vital interests. The US must continue to push the PRC back to the drawing board, by buttressing deterrence and sending a clear diplomatic and military message of “not today.”
Contributor Bios
Kenneth Fann is a Fellow at the Weatherhead Scholars Program and a Colonel in the United States Air Force. His research interests include the Chinese Communist Party instruments of National Power; political, economic, and social infrastructure; information; and physical geography and time.
Charles Bursi is a Research Fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Air Force. His research project concerns re-thinking US Defense readiness.
Captions
- Illustration of a dragon and porcupine overlaid onto a map of China and Taiwan. Credit: Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University/Kristin Caulfield
- President Joe Biden signs H.R. 4346, “The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022”, Tuesday, August 9, 2022, on the South Lawn of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Erin Scott). Credit: Flickr, The White House, United States Government Work
- ACC (Air Combat Command) Transformation - 2022. ACC is evolving its organizational structures, warfighting concept of operations, force presentation and generation models, and how it prepares its Airmen to ensure they are ready for a battlespace that is vastly different than what they have experienced over the past two decades. Video ID: 834073, United States, March 9, 2022. Credit: Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), Video by Staff Sgt. River Bruce, Air Combat Command Public Affairs. The appearance of US Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement
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2nd LAAD Stinger Range. Stingers are examples of the “quills,” or, the man-portable air defense systems that the US has supplied Taiwan, with potentially more on the way. US Marine Corps Sgt. Christopher P. Roseblossom, left, a low altitude air defense (LAAD) gunner with the 2nd LAAD Battalion, fires an FIM- 92 Stinger missile during a live-fire training exercise at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Oct. 10, 2017. Marines with the 2nd LAAD conducted a live-fire exercise to maintain proficiency and accuracy with various weapon systems. Photo ID: 3855061, Camp LeJeune, NC, United States, October 10, 2017. Credit: Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS), US Marine Corp, Lance Cpl. Cody J. Ohira, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing. The appearance of US Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement