Why Venezuela?

Since the beginning of 2025, the Trump administration has been targeting Venezuela and Venezuelan immigrants on multiple fronts. This fall the US military began blowing up Venezuelan “drug boats” without providing evidence of drug trafficking, resulting in allegations of war crimes. Currently 25 percent of the US Navy is stationed off the coast of Venezuela, while covert operations continue inland. The Trump administration has tried to pressure President Nicolás Maduro to step down, to no avail. What is the key motivation behind US aggression? Is the goal to stem drug trafficking, halt migration, change the regime, gain access to Venezuela’s oil, be a hegemon in the region—or all of the above? 

We asked three experts to share insights that go beyond the headlines. Faculty Associate Steven Levitsky is the David Rockefeller Professor of Latin American Studies at Harvard University; Annette Idler is an associate professor in global security at the University of Oxford's Blavatnik School of Government; and Boris Muñoz is a Venezuelan journalist and author. This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Q: The Trump administration has been open about wanting a regime change in Venezuela and is clearly threatening invasion via hostile acts against the country. Why is Venezuela so important to the US? 

STEVE LEVITSKY: I'm not sure that Venezuela is that important to the US. I think it may or may not be important to the Trump administration, but that's not the same thing. This is a very highly personalistic government that has shown itself in foreign policy repeatedly to be swayed by different factions of its own government, and secondly, often to respond either to material inducements for Trump and his family or personal flattery. When the government is moved by personal flattery or private enrichment, there's a very, very tenuous relationship between government behavior and the interests of the United States, so I'm not at all convinced that Venezuela is important to the United States. 

BORIS MUÑOZ: I find it hard to believe that there is an immediate threat from Venezuela, other than the argument that drug traffickers from Venezuela are bringing drugs from the country to the US, which is also kind of a half-truth. Venezuela mainly exports cocaine processed in Colombia and other places, so Venezuela is more likely the way out for that drug—but mostly to Europe, not to the United States. President Trump’s argument is that they are after fentanyl, mostly, and fentanyl is produced in Mexico with materials from China. So it’s very difficult to sustain that pretext.

ANNETTE IDLER: I would say that this threat, or the risk, is constructed and not actual. So they've designated two groups as foreign terrorist organizations. The Tren de Aragua, which is a transnational criminal network, does originate in Venezuela and is present in several Latin American countries, but there's no credible evidence that it's “invading” the US, or that Maduro is directing migration flow. The other group is the so-called Cartel de los Soles, and the US claims that Maduro heads it, but the Cartel de los Soles is not an organized group as such. It is an umbrella term for Venezuelan officials that are somewhat involved in facilitating cocaine transit and organized crime, but there is no central command or hierarchy, and that's why the idea of Maduro leading a cartel is maybe a politicized interpretation, but it's not based on evidence. And then, on the migration issue, Trump claimed at some point that Maduro is emptying prisons and asylums. Again, there's no evidence that this is true. 

Q: What about the claim that squeezing Cuba is the underlying goal here given that Marco Rubio has long had an anticommunist platform and considers Cuba a national security threat?

ANNETTE IDLER: We know that Marco Rubio is probably the one most likely to want to see a regime change in Venezuela—and not just Venezuela, but Cuba too. Some journalists argue that the end goal is actually Cuba, because, for example, the US sanctions on Venezuelan oil have managed to cut, I think, about 50,000 barrels of oil per day that would have normally gone to Cuba. So there's another factor here that again shows that Venezuela itself is not the actual threat as such. It's more being used as a pretext, and of course also linked to these personal motivations, as Steve mentioned.

BORIS MUÑOZ: Marco Rubio has a deep affinity with a group of prominent politicians and lawmakers in Florida who are advocating for regime change in Venezuela. He is from Florida and has this background: his parents left Cuba because of the revolution. So he also wants to somehow, directly or indirectly, hit the Cuban government. If he manages to bring about regime change in Venezuela, he can try to withdraw support to Cuba. Venezuela has been a very important economic supporter of the Cuban government as an oil provider and provider of many other resources.  

Q: What about the theory that Trump is seeking geopolitical dominance in the region, to counter the ambitions of Putin-led alliances in the East?

BORIS MUÑOZ: Yes, there are other elements to this story that I think are more interesting for the administration, particularly the geopolitical situation. Venezuela is kind of a playground for many different actors that are involved in illicit and licit activities. Venezuela’s government has deep connections with the Iranian government. Iran has facilitated different industries in Venezuela, from transportation to technology. That relationship is a black box, so we don’t know exactly what’s going on behind what everyone suspects are shady arrangements—but technology, transportation, food, and other things are transactions between Venezuela and Iran. 

Also, Cuba plays a major part in the security apparatus of the government, providing security and surveillance to Maduro and his group. Russia has been a partner in defense for Venezuela for many years. The Venezuelan Air Force owns a fleet of Sukhoi military planes that are very sophisticated. I don’t know much about military issues, but those planes are some of the most advanced in Latin America, and Venezuela’s fleet is big in regional terms. China’s presence is also key. China is the major lender to Venezuela. They have given more money to the government than any other country in Latin America. I think it’s about $60 billion that the Venezuelan government owes China and is paying back with oil. Venezuela is a mineral-rich country; it has coltan, and of course oil is the main commodity. So I don’t think there is a single factor, but all those elements add up when you think about US interests in Venezuela.

ANNETTE IDLER: Lots of people talk about this as a major reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, making clear that the US sees Latin America as its own sphere of influence, where external powers should not interfere and where the US reserves the right to intervene to protect its interests. And yes, there is a lot of presence and strong ties, especially between Russia and China and Venezuela respectively. But I guess there's one mismatch here: the military buildup itself. If that is something that should trigger a response by Venezuela, I think it's unlikely that either Russia or China—or Iran—would intervene militarily. If anything, it might actually push Venezuela closer to Russia and China as they seek protection from them.

STEVE LEVITSKY: Unless they overthrow Maduro. If they carry out regime change, that would almost certainly dramatically reduce at least the military and diplomatic ties; economic ties might continue. I think the argument is pretty overstated. There's no question that Russia and China have established ties, as Annette and Boris pointed out very clearly, and that Venezuela cooperates with a number of states that are somewhere in the anti-US axis. This is really basic international relations: Russia and China are balancing. But this is not a particularly important beachhead for either state in the Americas. If an oil-producing government is willing to cooperate with Russia and China and enable them to embarrass or thumb their nose at the United States a little bit, great: Russia and China are happy to have it. They're not going to walk away from such an alliance, but neither country—and this goes also for Iran—has a really important stake in Venezuela. China’s got some money invested there, but if this regime were to collapse tomorrow, none of these countries would be seriously affected, and, as Annette pointed out, none of them is going to go to the mat to save this regime.

The other thing is that Venezuela has been declining into failed-state status for the last decade. Fifteen years ago—when oil money was flowing and [then-President Hugo] Chávez was really popular and promoting his model across parts of the region—one could make an argument that that represented some sort of geopolitical threat to the United States and the region, and that its alignment with our foreign rivals was not a good thing. Now this is mostly just a weight on China. I would not be shocked if the Chinese government regrets its investments in Venezuela. Russia's not in a position where Venezuela is helping it much. This is not benefiting our rivals much at all. It's basically just a failed state. There's not that much at stake here. This is not Cuba 1962.

Q: What about oil? Venezuela is said to have the world’s largest proven oil reserves, even larger than Saudi Arabia’s. Doesn’t the US need better access to oil to diversify its sources? Many countries have clashed over oil. Is this a factor here?

ANNETTE IDLER: Maduro claims that the US seeks Venezuela's oil; Washington says no, that's not the case. Energy is important—energy security—and you could argue that after the war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East, access to diversified oil sources is more important for the US. We've seen that to some extent with how Washington was willing to selectively engage to manage oil flows—for example, by allowing Chevron to resume limited operations in Venezuela under a US license issued in 2022, a decision that was later revised and partially rolled back. We've also seen how sanctions can be tightened or loosened, including the ones linked to what I mentioned with Cuba. But again, that's not the official reason for the deployment. Going back to Russia and China: their economic ties are not just with Venezuela; they are with many Latin American countries. So if the US were really interested in increasing its economic leverage in Latin America, why would it focus only on Venezuela? It would really have to change its approach to the entire region when it comes to economic ties. 

STEVE LEVITSKY: I think oil is a marginal factor. If you take oil out of the picture—if this were Argentina or a smaller oil producer at the margins—the US would probably be less engaged. But there are lots of ways to gain access to oil. At the other extreme, we could just as easily establish peace and diplomatic and economic relations with the Maduro government and gain similar access to oil. Venezuela needs to sell its oil. Oil producers need to sell their oil, and we can get oil on the market. The oil sector in Venezuela has been destroyed and is not producing anywhere near what its potential is. So one way is overthrowing the Maduro government and establishing a broadly pro-Western government that invests and gradually builds up the oil sector. But peace with Venezuela under the current regime is another equally viable path. So I don't think oil explains the march to war.

Q: The US government has been signaling its desire for regime change in Venezuela for a while—but now that it seems imminent one way or another, I wonder what Venezuelans think about this? 

BORIS MUÑOZ: I’m not a pollster, but I think the majority of people in Venezuela dislike the idea of an intervention, yet they want the regime changed. They want Maduro gone. I think that’s an absolute majority. If you look at the numbers the opposition published last year for the election, 70 percent—I think that’s a conservative number—supported the opposition candidate, Edmundo González Urrutia. Maduro got about 30 percent. Of that 30 percent, many were public officials or employees who were pressured to vote for the government. The government has a very effective mechanism for social control. It’s complicated, but, for example, if you don’t vote for the government, you don’t get food. They made sure to move their apparatus of social control to have people voting for Maduro. So I think it’s a justified impression, even if it’s not scientific, that the vast majority supports regime change. People probably don’t want to see their country invaded by a foreign army, but they’ve had enough. It’s been twenty-six years of this, and particularly the last thirteen years have been misery. Venezuelans are anxious for change.

Q: Even though Nicolás Maduro assumed the presidency in the 2024 election, the opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia—who took the place of banned frontrunner María Corina Machado—won by a landslide, as confirmed by multiple sources.

If most Venezuelans believe that Maduro is an illegitimate president, could there be an upside to regime change? If Maduro is overthrown, is this a chance to put forth a democratically elected leader?

STEVE LEVITSKY: I think it's possible. There’s a lot of uncertainty. Anytime you overthrow a regime militarily in a state the size of Venezuela, there's a lot of uncertainty. This is not Panama. In fact, the United States has never invaded a country the size of Venezuela in this hemisphere. It's never invaded a country, to my knowledge, in South America. So this is a much bigger deal than typical US military interventions going back 100 years, or even going back to 1989, when we invaded Panama. The Venezuelan state has been rotting and deeply corrupted over the last couple of decades, such that there's no certainty we could easily establish a government that controls the national territory and can be the base for a new regime. All of that said, I think there's a good possibility. Every bit of evidence I've seen suggests that Machado—and, by extension, González, the guy who was legitimately elected president—have far and away the greatest legitimacy of any political figures in Venezuela. I think they would have large-scale support, even if brought to power by military invasion, although that is hard to say for sure. But there is a decent chance that a US military invasion and successful removal of the Maduro government—again, with tons of uncertainties and possible paths—could lead to the establishment of a civilian government under Machado and her team, which could re-democratize Venezuela.

ANNETTE IDLER: I guess I'm a bit more skeptical. Venezuelans definitely want political change, and yes, Machado and others would have support, but I don't think foreign military intervention or action is the best way of bringing that change about. 

STEVE LEVITSKY: I didn't say it was the best way, I said it was a plausible way.

ANNETTE IDLER: Yes, it’s one way. I do think that path would come with very, very high risk. Venezuela is a fragile state, or at least one with very low governance in its territory. It's a country with lots of armed militias, defense groups, and even the ELN, the Colombian rebel group, is active there. So if we have some sort of regime change, coup, or invasion, there are lots of people who would then try to defend Venezuela. They can't match the military capability of the US, but there would be a very messy situation with all these different groups involved. 

In the end, I think a favorable outcome would really have to come with regional backing as well. You’d also need sustained humanitarian and economic support. And ultimately, in line with many other US military interventions we've seen elsewhere, we would need a plan for the day after. If there is no plan for the day after—yes, we change the regime, Maduro is gone—what do we do then? How are we going to govern that territory? What do we do with the military and regime insiders? I think such an intervention has a high risk of backfiring.

BORIS MUÑOZ: It's not going to be peaceful. We can hope the mayhem is not catastrophic. But there are many armed groups in Venezuela from different corners. Almost all of them are criminal or pseudo-criminal in terms that they come from the former Colombian guerrillas that control mines in the south of the country. There are gangs that deal with human trafficking, and there are colectivos, sort of paramilitary groups supported by the government. I think that the opposition, led by María Corina Machado, has some ideas about how to control that, but I think it's not going to be that easy. I think Machado is a legitimate national leader. She’s not the president, and I don’t think she will be president at first, but eventually, in a couple of years or so, she could run and maybe win. That’s too far away to predict, but on paper and based on the facts we have, the new government would be presided over by Edmundo González Urrutia, and he would have some room to maneuver and appoint people he trusts. 

Q: Given all that we have discussed, how do you see the current US strategy—the buildup, the rhetoric—affecting the likelihood of change?

STEVE LEVITSKY: What US military mobilization does is change the calculus for Maduro, the military, and his inner circle. It raises the cost; it creates what is becoming a pretty credible threat that they could die if they try to stay in power—a threat that didn't exist before. Without that credible threat, it is almost impossible to remove this regime. This change in calculus increases the likelihood that Maduro and his inner circle will decide to take exile in Turkey or Russia or wherever. Not a high probability, but higher than before. It also increases the likelihood of some sort of coup or split in the regime. It may or may not work, but it's more likely to provoke regime change than doing nothing, in my view.

Q: Finally, does the prospect of regime change offer hope that some of the eight million refugees that fled Venezuela in the past decade-plus could return?

BORIS MUÑOZ: I think the problem is that Venezuelans have been basically held hostage by the government for many years. Those who really wanted a different future left the country, and now they’re also being pursued or chased in other countries. The best way to deal with that, in my view, is to create a stronger Venezuelan state and improve internal conditions so the country becomes more attractive for those Venezuelans to return. I think it would be better for Venezuelans than being pariahs in limbo in the US and other countries. They need a place to return to. It’s a very difficult and perilous time, so we can only hope for the best.

Contributor Bios

Faculty Associate Steven Levitsky is the David Rockefeller Professor of Latin American Studies and director of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. His research focuses on Latin American politics; parties and party systems; and democracy and democratization. His most recent books, cowritten with Daniel Ziblatt, include How Democracies Die and Tyranny of the Minority. 

Annette Idler is an associate professor in global security at the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government and is the director of the Global Security Programme at Oxford’s Pembroke College. She was a 2019–2021 Visiting Scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Her recent coedited book is Transforming the War on Drugs: Warriors, Victims and Vulnerable Regions.

Boris Muñoz is an independent Venezuelan journalist and author. He has been published in several magazines and newspapers in the United States, Latin America, Venezuela, and Europe, including The New York Times, Newsweek, The New Yorker, El País, Gatopardo, El Malpensante, and Internazionale.