# Allies at Odds: Tracking the Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates **A deep dive into the motivations of two key Gulf states reveals how their tensions and shifting foreign policies reverberate throughout the Middle East.** February 03, 2025 Lauren Morganbesser '24 ![Two Middle Eastern me leaning in toward each other and whispering.](/sites/g/files/omnuum8931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__960x960_scale/public/epicenter/files/openingimage-ap24349453198788.jpg?itok=jZqisaGD) The UAE's Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, left, speaks with Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud during a meeting with the foreign ministers of the Arab Contact Group on Syria in Jordan's southern Red Sea coastal city of Aqaba, Saturday Dec. 14, 2024. *Credit:* [*AP Photo/Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/Pool; Image ID: 24349453198788*](https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/JordanUSBlinken/4a7fc84e75914e518d8cc634d2692cda)In today’s Middle East, the balance of power is shifting, a process that began more than a decade before the recent conflict in Israel/Gaza and the coup in Syria. Past US administrations have reoriented America’s foreign policy, stressing military drawdown in the Middle East in favor of a [pivot to Asia](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/). In response, Arab states in the Persian Gulf—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman—have increasingly moved to fill a regional vacuum. With the disintegration of traditional power centers in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, the oil-rich Arab Gulf states have mobilized their wealth into wide-ranging investments, including towering megaprojects, world-championship sports tournaments, and the renewable energy transition. The Arab Gulf states have coupled their domestic evolution with increasingly assertive foreign policies in nearly every conflict in the Middle East. Their foreign policies have irreversibly shaped the trajectory of the region, including the unprecedented Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel that served as a precursor to Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel and the current war that has pulled in numerous regional actors. While increasingly bellicose positioning between Israel and Iran dominates headlines, interrogating the strategies and motivations of the policies of Arab Gulf states is critical in understanding the future trajectory of the entire region. At the forefront of this regional shift are Saudi Arabia and the neighboring United Arab Emirates (UAE). Both are in many ways unrecognizable from the states they were fifty—or even ten—years ago, due to sweeping economic and social reforms. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has allowed women to drive, curbed the influence of religious clerics, and moved towards diversifying the country’s economy away from oil. In the UAE, the government has spent billions on development and tourism, from building the massive Louvre Abu Dhabi to the world’s tallest building in Dubai. As both countries have grown, so have their images of themselves internationally, becoming powerbrokers in conflicts ranging from Eritrea to Ukraine. ![Map of Middle East region highlighting Saudi Arabia and UAE along with three other countries currently in civil war: Syria, Yemen, and Sudan.](/sites/g/files/omnuum8931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__720x720_scale/public/epicenter/files/middleeast-map-700px.png?itok=clZVnjPf) *Credit: Kristin Caulfield*In the process, their relationship has also shifted. Traditionally, the countries have been allies, sharing regional interests centered on security concerns about Iran and common antipathy to Islamists. However, increased influence has also led to an increase in competition between the two. Both countries have become global hubs for business and investment, prompting commercial competition between them as well as divergence on foreign policy issues. Their economic positioning has induced competition, including through Saudi Arabia’s [Regional Headquarters program](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/saudi-arabia-headquarters-economy/), which requires multinational companies operating in the Middle East to establish their headquarters in the Kingdom, foregoing headquarters in Dubai. ## Understanding Foreign Policy Through the Lens of Civil War With [reports](https://www.wsj.com/articles/frenemies-saudi-crown-prince-mbs-clashes-uae-president-mbz-c500f9b1) of increasingly hostile rhetoric between the two countries’ leaders along with differing economic policies, the question emerges of whether each of their foreign policies have also shifted as a result. The Saudis and Emiratis share overarching foreign policy goals: containing the threat of Iran; moving toward peace with Israel through the Abraham Accords while ensuring some solution to the Palestinian question; and ensuring stability in the region to allow investments to fuel their respective [Vision 2030](https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en) goals. Despite their similar vision for the region’s future, three civil wars—in Syria, Sudan, and Yemen—saw the countries prioritizing different national security goals. Specifically, in each of the three civil wars, the UAE prioritized its economic strategic interests and anti-Islamism goals over countering Iran. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia prioritized countering Iran and stabilizing its neighboring countries over anti-Islamism. Analyzing each of these civil wars helps showcase their foreign policy divergence at its extremes. ## Syria (2011–present) ![Profile photo of Syrian man holding weapon in front of a white building with a mural.](/sites/g/files/omnuum8931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__720x720_scale/public/epicenter/files/syria-700px-ap24345694127660.jpg?itok=xEiq7StK) A Syrian opposition fighter holds a rocket launcher in front of the provincial government office, where an image of overthrown President Bashar Assad is riddled with bullets, in Hama, Syria, Friday, Dec. 6, 2024. *Credit:* [*AP Photo/Ghaith Alsayed; Image ID: 24345694127660*](https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SyriaFallofAssadPhotoGallery/d983d94f06d44c26944325fffe2641bf)While the civil war in Syria did not involve direct competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it nevertheless showcased the divergent evolution of their foreign policies over the past decade. When the Arab Spring uprising began in 2011, the two countries were aligned in supporting the more moderate forces that opposed the Assad regime, including the Free Syrian Army, the primary force of antigovernment protesters. As the conflict developed, however, the UAE was increasingly concerned by the rise of Islamist and radical groups that joined the fighting against the protesters, especially with the rise of ISIS in 2014. The UAE took an outsized role in the anti-ISIS coalition, changing its primary goal from removing Assad to quelling extremist groups. As the Emiratis focused their efforts on deterring and fighting radical Islamist forces, the Saudis doubled down, funding more extreme Salafi groups to try to oust Assad, including the [Army of Islam](https://www.reuters.com/article/world/saudi-arabia-boosts-salafist-rivals-to-al-qaeda-in-syria-idUSBRE9900RO/). Such Salafi groups follow ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim doctrine, but while they were fighting for religious rule in Syria, their goals were more nationalist than groups like al Qaeda, which have both regional and global ambitions. Salafism, which is also close to the Saudi royal families’ Wahhabi school of Islamic thought, has [historically](https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/12/influence-abroad-saudi-arabia-replaces-salafism-in-its-soft-power-outreach?lang=en) been supported by the Saudis but opposed by the Emiratis, who oppose all forms of politicized Islam. As Saudi Arabia’s role in Syria expanded, the Emiratis took a step back, concerned with their ally’s funding of opposition groups. By 2015, Assad’s position had been greatly weakened, with both ISIS and Saudi-backed rebel forces seizing territory from the government. However, after successful Iranian lobbying, Russia’s Vladimir Putin intervened to tilt the balance in Assad’s favor. When the Russians intervened, they found an unlikely ally in the Emiratis, who preferred the stability of Assad’s rule to the uncertainty and potential radicalizing force of the Saudi-backed rebel groups. In response to the UAE’s policy, Saudi Arabia embraced a more open position to Assad, albeit more slowly. While the UAE tried to convince Saudi Arabia to join its policy of rapprochement as early as 2016, Saudi Arabia’s hesitations in part lay in the US’s opposition to rapprochement with Assad and Syria’s ties to Iran. Ultimately, the Saudis changed course and followed in the footsteps of the Emiratis, renormalizing relations with Assad and allowing his re-entry into the Arab League in May 2023. This shift in Saudi policy occurred alongside the Kingdom’s gradual reconciliation with Iran, with the two adversaries restoring relations in a [Chinese-brokered deal](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/11/us/politics/saudi-arabia-iran-china-biden.html) in March 2023, showcasing a recalibrated foreign policy focused on diplomatic initiatives to reduce tensions with neighboring countries. Thus, the Syrian civil war showcases an example of the divergence between Saudi and Emirati foreign policies and their visions for Syria’s future. Ultimately, in the late stages of the war, this tension was resolved in the Emirates’ favor, resulting in Assad’s rehabilitation and reintegration by Arab countries in an attempt to distance Syria from Iran’s orbit. However, recent events in Syria have changed the reality on the ground once again. On December 8, after a lightning offensive, Syria rebels led by the paramilitary coalition Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) seized Damascus, sending Assad fleeing and officially ending six decades of the Assad family’s autocratic rule. After Assad’s overthrow, an [early statement](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-official-syria-not-out-woods-no-knowledge-whether-assad-is-uae-2024-12-08/) from top Emirati official Anwar Gargash stressed that Assad’s fall lay partially in his failure to work with Arab partners, saying, “Now there was a major failure, basically, in part in politics and policy, because Assad did not really use the sort of, you know, lifeline, that was thrown to him by various Arab countries, including the UAE, and did not really use that to open up.” Although the UAE’s efforts to reintegrate Assad seemed to be progressing, events within Syria revealed a different reality. These changes force the Arab Gulf states to once again rethink and recalibrate their policy toward Syria, and in recent weeks, both countries have focused on [outreach](https://www.arabnews.com/node/2587026/middle-east) to Syria's new leadership. ## Sudan (2023–present) ![Refugees leave Saudi ship in port.](/sites/g/files/omnuum8931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__720x720_scale/public/epicenter/files/refugees-700px-ap23124661634257.jpg?itok=_fAQdk1P) Evacuees leave Saudi Amanah ship after landing at Jeddah port, Saudi Arabia, Thursday, May 4, 2023. After more than two weeks of fighting, areas of the capital of Khartoum appear increasingly abandoned. The Sudan fighting, which broke out after months of escalating tension between the country’s military and a rival paramilitary group, has so far killed at least 550 people and displaced hundreds of thousands. *Credit:* [*AP Photo/Amr Nabil; Image ID: 23124661634257*](https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/SaudiArabiaSudanEvacuees/6788dda0e4474dac9aceca3d9e19fc63)Saudi Arabia and the UAE both have a long history of meddling in the internal affairs of Sudan. Sudan’s strategic and proximate location, large size, and Muslim- and Arab-majority population make it uniquely important for the Gulf countries. Historically, their interference focused on limiting the threats posed by the role of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Today’s civil war in Sudan, which began in April 2023, has intensified, with at least [60,000 dead](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crln9lk51dro) and [twelve million displaced](https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/sudan/#:~:text=Nearly%208.5%20million%20people%20have,(as%20of%20November%202024).&text=Refugees%20lived%20in%20Sudan%20prior,highest%20refugee%20population%20in%20Africa). The war was precipitated by Saudi and Emirati involvement in ousting long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir and subsequently promoting the military over civilian government. In the confusion of the post-Bashir order, the Saudis and Emiratis promoted military over civilian forces. This included both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). Today, these two parallel military forces are fighting a civil war for control of Sudan. The UAE has maintained a longstanding relationship with the RSF, including historic cooperation in other regional wars, as RSF fighters have fought on the side of the UAE in Yemen and Libya. Before the outbreak of war in April 2023, Hemedti visited Abu Dhabi in both February and March, meeting with top officials, and has also used the UAE as the commercial headquarters of the RSF, [stationing his youngest brother](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2772) to lead regional ventures there. Since the start of the war, the UAE has officially been in Sudan in a humanitarian capacity, sending aid packages and renovating schools. However, the UAE has also been accused of financing and arming the RSF, giving the Emiratis leverage over the SAF. [Investigative journalists](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/29/world/africa/sudan-war-united-arab-emirates-chad.html) have uncovered a darker side to the Emiratis’ aid shipments, as they have reportedly given cover to massive weapons shipments through Chad. The UAE has two major objectives in backing the RSF in Sudan. The first is gaining a foothold in a strategically important and economically advantageous country. The UAE is Sudan’s largest export destination, purchasing $2.85 billion or 53.3 percent of Sudan’s total exports in 2021, particularly gold exports. The UAE is interested in gaining a foothold on the Red Sea, particularly through acquiring ports, a major foreign policy priority of the Emiratis. In pursuit of this objective, in 2022, before the outbreak of war, the Abu Dhabi Ports Group signed a $6 billion contract to build the Abu Amana port in Sudan on the coast of the Red Sea, a project that the Emiratis remain focused on obtaining after the end of fighting in the current war. The UAE’s second objective lies in its concerns about an Islamist, democratic, or otherwise unstable future for Sudan’s leadership, preferring a stable regime run by the military to the uncertainties of the former. The UAE is deeply concerned about the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, particularly given its deep history within the country and Sudan’s geographical proximity to the UAE. Saudi and Emirati meddling in Sudan, both when Bashir was in power and after his overthrow, centered around economic incentives to move Sudan away from countries that supported Islamist groups, including Turkey, Qatar, and Iran. However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have differed markedly in their support for the SAF’s General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The Emiratis see Burhan as linked to the remnants of Islamist movements from Bashir’s rule, and consequently, they are working to ensure that Hemedti, whom they trust more, defeats Burhan. Saudi Arabia’s position in Sudan looks different. Saudi Arabia historically had close ties to both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Increasingly, Saudi Arabia has focused on playing a mediating role in the conflict. Saudi Arabia’s fears of Sudanese instability center around a potential refugee crisis and the proliferation of armed groups. Instability in Sudan could also threaten Saudi Arabia’s goals under its Vision 2030, particularly tourist attractions on the Red Sea coast including the [smart-city megaproject Neom](https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabia-neom-middle-east-conflict-israel-peace-tourism-2024-5). Saudi Arabia has used the war in Sudan as an opportunity to bolster its image as a peacemaker by hosting peace talks, looking to improve its international reputation and legitimacy, particularly under the leadership of Crown Prince MBS. The Kingdom’s role in Sudan has focused on bolstering this image, including through picture-perfect welcomes of refugees and commitments to peace. The Saudi-Emirati rift in Sudan is better understood as a battle over competing visions for the future of the country instead of diverging support between competing generals. Saudi Arabia’s vision in Sudan centers around an end to the conflict, expertly and publicly mediated by the Kingdom alongside the US. For Saudi Arabia, shifting its international image from one of a pariah to one of peacemaker would help the Kingdom accomplish its economic goals, and avoid another endless war on its borders with dangerous spillover effects. For the UAE, the war contains the potential to secure a major ally which would come with significant resources and a key port on the Red Sea for the UAE to expand its maritime empire. Promoting Hemedti and ensuring his victory would also help ensure victory over both Islamism and democracy in Sudan, both of which appear as major threats to the UAE, by ensuring a stable military general in power. However, in supporting the RSF, the UAE necessarily frustrates the Saudis’ vision in Sudan: by improving the fighting capabilities of the RSF, the UAE has ensured that the SAF could not beat the RSF handily and has consequently prolonged the fighting within the country. Thus, the competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Sudan centers on their divergent visions, and without a consensus between them, the allies will continue to work to frustrate each other’s goals. ## Yemen (2014–present) ![Two Yemeni police officers inspecting the site of the destruction of houses.](/sites/g/files/omnuum8931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__720x720_scale/public/epicenter/files/yemen-700px-ap22091630635657.jpg?itok=vnOj-eVA) Yemeni police inspect a site of Saudi-led airstrikes targeting two houses in Sanaa, Yemen, Saturday, March 26, 2022. Yemen's warring sides have accepted a two-month truce, starting with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the UN envoy to Yemen said Friday, April 1. The envoy, Hans Grundberg, announced the agreement from Amman, Jordan, after meeting separately with both sides in the country's brutal civil war in recent days. He said that he hoped the truce would be renewed after two months. *Credit:* [*AP Photo/Hani Mohammed; Image ID: 22091630635657*](https://newsroom.ap.org/detail/Yemen/fbeab31626cb42c0b46b6047a326bb7d)Today, Yemen is the primary battleground for Saudi-Emirati competition. In 2015, when Yemen’s Houthi rebels took over the capital, Sana’a, and seized the presidential palace, Saudi Arabia responded by announcing an anti-Houthi coalition. The Emiratis quickly signed on, igniting the Yemeni civil war. Initially, the UAE and Saudi Arabia had similar objectives in Yemen: countering Iran and ensuring the security of Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, the latter goal is largely existential: an anti-Saudi neighbor on its border could bring disaster. By contrast, the UAE shares no land border with Yemen, so while regional stability is important to both the Saudis and Emiratis, the Saudis stand to lose more from an unstable Yemen. For the UAE, the economic opportunities presented by Yemen reign supreme, including Yemen’s ports which would allow them to secure a link to the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aden in Yemen’s south. As the war progressed, the UAE began to increase its autonomy of policy. Although both countries backed anti-Houthi groups, the groups themselves were at odds with each other, leading to the rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The group the UAE has supported is the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which calls for the establishment of a “sovereign independent federal state” in southern Yemen. The UAE’s support has been instrumental in the rise to power of the STC. As a result, the STC has successfully expanded its influence across southern Yemen to the detriment of its rivals, leading to competition with the internationally recognized government. The Saudis lent their support to many groups, including the Yemeni government and other Yemeni military and tribal forces. One such group supported by the Saudis is the Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah), a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated party that the STC rhetorically equates with al Qaeda and the Islamic State. While both groups are part of the anti-Houthi coalition, they strongly diverge. The UAE sees Islah as affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that it associates with having the potential to undermine its domestic security. As a result, the UAE is strongly opposed to working with Islah. Conversely, the Saudis are strongly opposed to the STC because they oppose the secessionist southern movement and the prospect of a divided Yemen, preferring the country to remain whole. By early 2020, after five years of involvement in the Saudi-led coalition, the UAE withdrew from Yemen, and subsequently, the STC ousted Islah from several areas in the south. By late 2021, Saudi-funded Islah fighters directly fought Emirati STC fighters (including in [Shabwa](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/clashes-oil-rich-shabwa-test-yemens-new-presidential-council-2022-08-11/)), a strange and competitive turn for two countries that had started off in the war as allies. By 2022, the United Nations brokered a nationwide truce in Yemen, leading to a reduction in fighting across the country by 85 percent within the first two months. As part of the truce, an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council was agreed upon by the Saudis and Emiratis to bring the anti-Houthi forces together, but that effort did not succeed. Groups within the council also continued to fight each other throughout the country, with battles in August 2023 marking the fiercest fighting in Yemen since the truce began in April 2022. STC-linked groups continue to try to take over Islah territory, including in Hadhramawt, a contentious area that shares a land border with Saudi Arabia and contains 80 percent of its oil. The Saudis see Hadhramawt as integral to Saudi security given the province’s extensive land border with the Kingdom. In response to the STC’s calls for Islah to withdraw its forces from Hadhramawt, Saudi Arabia created, funded, and trained their own new Yemeni paramilitary force known as the Nation Shield Force in Hadhramawt. Thus, the Yemeni civil war showcases the increasingly divergent foreign policies of the Saudis and Emiratis. Throughout the civil war, the Saudis and Emiratis have backed different and opposing sides that are necessarily at odds. The two sides differ on two key elements of Yemen’s future: whether to support the southern secession of Yemen or keep the country intact, as well as whether political Islamists should be allowed to be a political force in the country. Ultimately, the allies’ conflicting visions for the future of Yemen continue to put them at odds. ## Conclusion By looking at the three civil wars considered, the nuances of the rift between Saudi and Emirati foreign policies becomes visible. Syria is a case of policy divergence between Saudi Arabia and the UAE that ultimately was resolved in the Emirates’ favor through Saudi Arabia’s convergence towards the Emirati strategy of rapprochement with Assad. Sudan is a case of divergence centered around Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to be seen as a peacemaker, ambitions which have been frustrated by the Emiratis’ backing of one of the warring sides. Yemen is a case of a more serious divergence, born of serious differences in each country’s conception of its national interests. Demystifying the often-opaque foreign policies and relationship between the two leading Arab Gulf states allows for a greater understanding of what drives countries’ foreign policies in the Middle East. As conflict after conflict engulfs the region, outsiders—including successive American administrations—have misunderstood and misconstrued Middle Eastern countries’ foreign policies, obscuring their history, painting the region in overly simplistic terms, and remaining oblivious to the dynamics at play on the ground. ![Four men stand in front of the White House signing the Abraham Accords: Donald Trump, Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyani.](/sites/g/files/omnuum8931/files/styles/hwp_1_1__720x720_scale/public/epicenter/files/abrahamaccords-flickr-700px.jpg?itok=trAJJzM-) Signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. President Donald J. Trump, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Minister of Foreign Affairs for the United Arab Emirates Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyani sign the Abraham Accords Tuesday, Sept. 15, 2020, on the South Lawn of the White House. *Credit:* [*Official White House Photo by Tia Dufou; Public Domain, Flickr*](https://www.flickr.com/photos/whitehouse45/50346380856/)Nonetheless, America’s role in the world today is changing. America must face the waning of Pax Americana, as the international order shifts from a unipolar to a multipolar world. The emergence of multipolarity presents an opportunity for small or middle powers, including America’s allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to look beyond the US. The emergence of alternative power centers, particularly Russia and China, has allowed states to hedge their bets, reaping promising economic agreements without inviting lectures about human rights and democracy. This development, combined with an increasing sense that the US cannot do as much as it used to in the Middle East, presents a fundamental challenge to American power and supremacy and is an issue with which American foreign policymakers must contend. --- ## Contributor Bio Lauren Morganbesser was a 2023–2024 Undergraduate Associate at the Weatherhead Center. She graduated from Harvard College in 2024 with a bachelor’s degree from the Department of Government. She is currently a James C. Gaither Junior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See also:- [ Articles ](/media-type/articles) - [ February 2025 ](/month/february-2025) - [ Middle East & North Africa (MENA) ](/region/mena) - [ Foreign Policy ](/topics/foreign-policy) - [ Middle East ](/topics/middle-east) Share on:- [ Facebook ](#) - [ Twitter ](#) - [ Linkedin ](#)